Journal of Legislation
Volume 11 | Issue 2

Article 15

5-1-1984

Intercircuit Tribunal or a Court of Tax Appeals: A
Tax Litigation Perspective, An;White Scholar
Notes
J. Patrick Galvin Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Recommended Citation
Galvin, J. Patrick Jr. (1984) "Intercircuit Tribunal or a Court of Tax Appeals: A Tax Litigation Perspective, An;White Scholar Notes,"
Journal of Legislation: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 15.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol11/iss2/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

WHITE SCHOLAR NOTES
AN INTERCIRCUIT TRIBUNAL OR A COURT
OF TAX APPEALS: A TAX LITIGATION
PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION

Legal periodicals are replete with scholarly writing describing the
plight of the federal judicial system. Although scholars agree on the
problems-the litigation explosion, the judiciary's inability to cope
with swelling caseloads and the increasing delay in adjudication of
cases-they sharply disagree as to their resolution. Nevertheless, the
message is clear: the federal judicial system is imperiled.' The problem has reached a crisis point warranting immediate action.2
In response to this quandary, scholars have advanced an array of
proposals addressing these concerns and recommending solutions.3
The proposals range from sweeping structural reforms to minor refinements of the present system.4 Congress is presently considering legislation which would create an Intercircuit Tribunal (Tribunal) to act as a
1.

2.

3.

4.

In the past year alone, all nine justices of the United States Supreme Court have publicly
addressed the problems confronting the federal judicial system. Burger,AnnualReport on the
State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983); Jenkins, A Talk with Justice Blackmaun, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine) at 20; Address by Justice Brennan, Remarks at the
Third Circuit Judicial Conference, in Philadelphia (Sept. 9, 1982); Address by Justice Marshall, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judiciary Conference (Sept. 9, 1982); Address by Justice O'Connor, Comments on Supreme Court's Case Load, in New Orleans (Feb. 6, 1983);
Address by Justice Powell, American Bar Association Division of Judicial Administration, in
San Francisco (Aug. 9, 1982); Address by Justice Rehnquist, Remarks at the MacSwenford
Lecture, University of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982); Stevens, Some Thoughts on JudicialRestraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177 (1982) (Address before The American Judicature Society, Aug.
6, 1982); White, The Work of The Supreme Court.- A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 346 (1982).
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in his annual report on the state of the judiciary to the
American Bar Association (Feb. 6, 1983), stated: "Today I will focus on only one subject,
which is perhaps the most important single immediate problem facing the judiciary, and that
is the caseload of the Supreme Court and the need for the 'time and freshness of mind and
reflection. . . indispensible to thoughtful unhurried decision.'" Burger, supra note 1, at 442.
Many of these proposals merit serious consideration, such as the creation of en banc procedures in each circuit to preclude the development of intercircuit conflicts. See Wallace, The
Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts A Solution Neededfor a Mountain or a Molehill?,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 935-40 (1983). See also M. Handler, What to do with the Supreme
Court's Burgeoning Calendars?, 46-47 (1983) (unpublished manuscript). Other examples include the increased use of summary dispositions and brief per curiam opinions. See Wallace, id at 919-24. This note foregoes consideration of the above-mentioned proposals so as
to consider in depth the national court of appeals and the court of tax appeals.
An example of a non-structural proposal is that of direct congressional action to clarify legislation quickly to reduce the need for judicial interpretation of a statutory problem. See
Address by Judge Rubin, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Judicature Society (Feb.
5, 1983), reprintedin Rubin, Rxfor an overburdenedSupreme Court, 66 JUDICATURE 394, 401
(1983).
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national court of appeals, exercising jurisdiction over cases referred to
it by the United States Supreme Court.5 Proponents of the Tribunal
contend that it will relieve the workload of the Supreme Court and
provide greater national uniformity of federal law.6 Opponents argue
that creation of the Tribunal will simply add a fourth tier to an overgrown bureaucracy, increasing delay in the resolution of national law.7
A proper analysis of the merits of the Intercircuit Tribunal requires a
comprehensive study examining the manner in which the Tribunal addresses and eliminates the problems plaguing the federal judiciary.8
This note analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of the proposed Tribunal in one area of federal law, federal taxation, and proposes a court
of tax appeals as an alternative solution to eliminate many of the
problems inherent in tax litigation.' The host of problems facing the
federal courts are accentuated within the tax field where uniformity of
national law is a pressing need.' 0
THE STRUCTURE OF TAX LITIGATION
The present tax litigation structure breeds inconsistency and delay
5.

Congress is considering two bills that provide for the creation of an Intercircuit Tribunal:
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) introduced S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 23,
1845 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983); and Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) introduced
H.R. 1970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 27, 940 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
6.
According to Senator Dole, sponsor of S. 645, this legislation "would relieve the dramatically
increased workload of the Supreme Court" and "provide desperately needed decisional capacity for the resolution of disputes where nationwide conformity is needed, many which are
now left unsolved because the Supreme Court can not make room on its docket." 129 CONG.
REC. at S1947-48 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983).
7. See, e.g., Commission on Revision of the FederalCourtAppellate System, 1975 Hearings, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1311, 1316 (1975) (letter from Judge Friendly introduced during testimony of
Leo Levin) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Commission Hearings].
8.
Judge Wallace notes that "[cihange should not be rejected merely because it is different. But
neither should change be implemented without determining if a need exists and whether the
proposed solution adequately meets the need." Wallace, supra note 3, at 941.
9.
To focus only on the Tribunal and the Court of Tax Appeals requires a large but calculated
assumption that many of the proposals advanced, while of considerable merit and perhaps
worthy of implementation, are not extensive enough to effect a lasting solution in tax litigation. The concept of an "incremental approach [to] structural reform," Wallace, supra note
3, at 941, has considerable merit in preserving the essential elements of a federal judicial
system which has proven remarkably effective and resilient in adapting to rapidly changing
currents of litigation. However, the crux of the problem in tax litigation lies in a dysfunctional structure, and nothing short of structural reform will help significantly. The authors
believe that specialization of the appellate tax function is the preferable structural reform
precisely because it preserves the advantages and stability of the existing federal judicial
structure and simultaneously equips the structure with the capacity to effectively adjudicate
tax questions which now go unanswered.
10. Patent law is another area where uniformity of national law is essential. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11, 14
(1982) (citing uniformity of patent law as a primary reason for enacting the new Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit). The removal of patent cases from the jurisdiction of the
geographic courts of appeals, however, has largely accomplished the task of making patent
law nationally uniform. See infra note 12. The proposed Intercircuit Tribunal would not,
therefore, affect patent law, but would affect tax law, which remains within the general court
structure. It seems pertinent, then, to examine the impact of the Tribunal in alleviating the
myriad problems in tax litigation. If the proposed court's value to the entire federal court
system is dubious, its value in a particular area which it purports to affect significantly, such
as federal taxation, would have to be great to justify its enactment.
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in the final resolution of tax issues." A massive bureaucracy, the tax
litigation system is comprised of three different forums at the trial
level,' 2 thirteen courts of appeals (including the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit)' 3 and discretionary review by the Supreme
Court.' 4 Tax cases originate in three different types of trial forums: the
district courts, the Tax Court, and the Claims Court.'" District court6
decisions are appealable to the appropriate circuit court of appeals.'
Tax Court decisions are appealable to any circuit court of appeals
where the action could have originally been brought.' 7 Thus, Tax
Court appeals fan out to the various courts of appeals, effecting an inverted pyramid (see Diagram 1). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reviews Claims Court decisions.' 8 Ultimately, decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are reviewable by the United
States Supreme Court on certiorari.' 9
The Tax Court's unique function compounds this problematic
structure. The Tax Court considers itself a national court bound only

by a Supreme Court decision or a circuit court opinion "squarely in
point where appeal lies to that court of appeals and to that court
alone."2 In the absence of a controlling circuit precedent directly in
point, the Tax Court will apply its view of the law, disregarding precedents established in other circuits.2 '
In sum, the present tax structure provides for judicial interpretation
of tax law on the appellate level by thirteen different courts of appeals
and a semi-independent Tax Court, with only occasional review by the
11.
12.

R. MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxES 209 (1943).
The trial level consists of (1) the United States Tax Court, an article I tribunal with jurisdiction over all disputes arising under The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7442 (1982); (2)
the district courts, which have jurisdiction over suits involving revenue matters, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1340 (1982); and (3) the United States Claims Court. The Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), combined the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Previously, the Court of Claims, an article III tribunal, consisted of a trial and an appellate level. At the trial level, all taxpayer suits have been
consolidated into the United States Claims Court, an Article I tribunal, and all appeals have
been consolidated into the newly created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The
United States Claims Court has the same jurisdiction as the old Court of Claims to render
judgment on most claims against the United States. For a further analysis, see The New
Court ofAppeals For the FederalCircuit, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 732 (1983).
13. Appeals from the three different trial forums are reviewed by the courts of appeals. See
discussion supra note 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 7842 (1982).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 7842 (1982). In addition, an appeal of right may be made to the Supreme Court
when a lower court holds an act of Congress unconstitutional, 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) and
review may be had by certification, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982). However, both of these occur
only in very rare instances.
15. See discussion supra note 12.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1982).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 7842 (1982).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3)(1982).
19. See discussion supra note 12.
20. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aft'donothergrounds, 455 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
21. Tax Court Improvement Act of 1979." Hearingson S. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation
and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 67
(1979) (statement of Mortimer Caplin, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Tax Court Hearings].
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Supreme Court. This system results in inconsistent interpretations of
tax issues, creating intercircuit conflicts and delay in the resolution of
tax cases.
DIAGRAM 122
TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION AND ROUTES OF APPEAL IN TAX LITIGATION
UNDER PRESENT LAW

COUR

SUP EM
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SOURCE:

REPORT ON

1979 T~x COURT BILL, sOpra note 22.

THE INTERCIRCUIT TRIBUNAL
The proposed Intercircuit Tribunal parallels past recommendations
from various scholars and commissions for a national court of appeals.
The Freund Committee and Hruska Commission proposals for a National Court of Appeals in 197223 and 197524 spurred a decade of bitter
debate over the merits of adding a fourth tier to our federal court structure .25 The debate has not subsided with the failure of these proposals,
22.

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE PROPOSED COURT OF TAX APPEALS (Sept. 11, 1979) (prepared by Leland Beck, Legislative
Attorney, American Law Division, U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
ON 1979 TAX COURT BILL]. Diagrams one, two, and three in this note are based on factual
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REVISING THE TAX LITIGATION STRUCTURE:

data from this source.

23. See

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, reprintedin 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Freund Committee, chaired by Paul Freund, was established by the Chief

24.

25.

Justice in 1970 to study the workload of the Supreme Court.
See U.S. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCRECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67
TURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]. The Hruska Commission was established by Congress in 1973 to study the structure of the federal judicial
system. It was chaired by Senator Roman L. Hruska and consisted of a sixteen-man panel.
For a summary of the profuse literature on the national court of appeals proposals, see
Leventhal, A Modest Proposalora Murticircuit Court ofAppeals, 24 Am. U.L. REV. 881, 888-
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but has raged on, breeding new proposals in the wake of earlier failures. Current proposals, more streamlined and sophisticated than their
predecessors, eliminate many of the more objectionable features of the
original proposals.2 6
The existence of more palatable proposals and the realization that
the problems highlighted by the Freund and Hruska studies have become more acute have propelled the idea of an intermediate appellate
court into a live and controversial subject.27 Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger proposed a temporary intermediate court of appeals in his 1983
State of the Judiciary Address.2 8 Two parallel bills introduced in the
House and Senate during the 98th Congress were each designed to implement the Chief Justice's proposal.2 9
Each bill seeks to create a temporary Intercircuit Tribunal which
would be a division of the United States Court of Appeals. 30 A sunset
provision in each bill provides that the Tribunal would cease to exist
after five years unless Congress acted to retain the Tribunal.3 ' The Tribunal's jurisdiction would be limited to cases referred from the
Supreme Court rather than through direct appeals from the lower federal courts.32 The Tribunal would not technically be a fourth tier, nor 3a3
circuit court of appeals, but somewhere in between (see Diagram 2).
Its function, although not entirely clear, 34 would be similar to an overflow chamber which absorbs cases referred to it by the Supreme

26.

27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.

91 (1975) (summarizing the literature following the Freund Committee proposal in 1972);
Wallace, supra note 3, at 914-15 & n. 9-10 (summarizing the literature following the Hruska
Commission proposal in 1975).
The Freund Committee proposal envisioned an intermediate appellate court which would
perform the screening function of the Supreme Court by reviewing petitions for certiorari
and deciding which cases were suitable for Supreme Court resolution. See FREUND COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 18. This feature of the proposed court was roundly criticized by commentators and by the Justices themselves. See Wallace, supra note 3, at 914 nn.
9-10. The Hruska Commission proposal was criticized for potentially increasing the burden
on the Supreme Court rather than reducing it, by requiring the Justices to spend a considerable amount of time deciding which cases to refer to the National Court of Appeals. See W.
Coleman, The United States Supreme Court: Managing its Caseload to Achieve its Unique
Constitutional Purpose, Remarks at the 13th Annual John F. Sonnett Lecture at Fordham
University School of Law 35 (May 9, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as
Coleman Remarks].
In the year ending June 30, 1981, the number of appeals filed in the federal courts of appeals
had increased 400% since 1960, 58.3% since 1975, the year the Hruska Commission published
its report, and 13.6% over the number filed in the previous fiscal year. It is uncertain at
present whether caseloads will continue to increase as rapidly. See Posner, Will The Federal
Courts Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the JudicialFunction, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761-62 n.2 and accompanying text. (1983).
Burger, supra note 1, at 447.
S. 645 and H.R. 1970, supra note 5.
S. 645, supra note 5, § 61(a)(l); H.R. 1970, supra note 5, §§ 2(1), 61(a)(1).
S. 645, supra note 5, § 607(d)(1); H.R. 1970, supra note 5, § 7(d)(2).
S. 645, supra note 5, § 1271; H.R. 1970, supra note 5, §§ 4(b), 1271.
For the Tribunal to technically constitute a fourth tier, it must stand between the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court, as the initial Freund Committee proposed. The Tribunal, as
presently conceived, has no direct contact with the courts of appeals (see Diagram 2); it
serves only one master, the Supreme Court. Its entire jurisdiction is within the discretion of
the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the Tribunal creates a fourth layer of procedural process
for cases which are referred from the Supreme Court to the Tribunal.
Letter from Alan B. Morrison to Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr., D-N.J., Chairman,
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Court.3 5

Considerable disagreement exists concerning the judicial composition of the Tribunal. 36 Both the House and Senate bills proposed that
existing judges in active service or senior judges designated from each
circuit court of appeals comprise the court.37 The Tribunal would hear
cases in random panels of seven or nine judges.3 8 Rotation of the
DIAGRAM 2
TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION AND ROUTES OF APPEAL IN TAX LITIGATION
UNDER H.R. 1970 AND S. 645
U.S.
INTERCIRCUIT
TRIBUNAL

OURTOFAPPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS
3rd CicuitD.C
4h
ircut

District
Court

District
Curt.

COURT OF APPEALS]
CiruitFederal

COURTOFAPPEALS
Circuit

Appeals
Courts
Thal Courts

District
Cou.

U.S.TAX COURT

US CLAIMS COURT

SOURCE: REPORT ON 1979 TAX COURT BILL, supra note 22.

35.

36.

37.

38.

House Comm. on the Judiciary (July 19, 1983) (statement drafted by 14 attorneys in federal
practice). Part of the letter reads:
Our initial concern is the uncertainty as to which cases now heard by the Supreme
Court would be heard by the new Tribunal. Undoubtedly, different people have different ideas of which cases would and should be referred by the Supreme Court to
this Tribunal, but the bills as now written fail to provide any standards or limitations
that would guide the Court in making referrals or Congress in evaluating the efficacy
of providing for such referrals.
See also, Letter from C.J. Donald P. Lay (2nd Cir.) to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, D-Wis. (June 7, 1983) (incorporating Sneed, Comments on H.R. 1970 and S. 645,
at 2-8).
Hearings on H. A1970 Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (statement of
Daniel J. Meador, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia) (not yet published) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on HR 1970].
Compare id at 9-10 (statement of Charles L. Wiggins) with id. at 10-12 (statement of John P.
Frank) (both witnesses speculating on the consequences of the rotating panels ofjudges). In
fact, the Tribunal's composition was heavily criticized at the Hearingson H.R.1970 by proponents and opponents alike. See, e.g., id. at 9-10 (statement of Charles L. Wiggins); id at
15 (statement of Leo T. Levin, Director of the Federal Judicial Center).
S. 645, supra note 5, § 61(a)(1); H.R. 1970, supra note 5, §§ 2(a), 61(a)(l). The selection of
two judges from each circuit creates a pool of 26 judges; the panels of the Intercircuit Tribunal are chosen from this pool. The total of 28 judges cited in H.R. 1970 is apparently an
oversight.
S. 645, supra note 5, as amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee, establishes a nine-judge
panel. H.R. 1970 establishes a seven-judge panel, H.R. 1970, supra note 5, §§ 2(a), 61(a)(2).
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panels would be staggered with each judge serving a three- or five-year
term.39
The nature of the Tribunal's workload has been the subject of much
speculation, which suggests that current proposals are dangerously
vague about the Tribunal's function.' Apparently the Supreme Court
would refer cases involving statutory interpretation to the Tribunal, reserving the larger part of its own docket for thornier constitutional issues of national importance. 4 '
A typical case referred to the Tribunal would involve a conflict between two or more circuit decisions interpreting a federal statute which
the Supreme Court felt required a nationally binding decision, but did
not have the time or inclination to consider itself.42 Tax cases would
fall within this category because of their statutory nature and the
Supreme Court's historic reluctance to hear tax cases.4 3 Estimates of
the number of tax cases which the Tribunal would adjudicate are speculative;" however, tax cases would comprise one of the largest categories of cases which the Supreme Court would refer.45 The remainder
would be a combination of labor, antitrust, immigration and naturalization, administrative agency appeals, federal civil procedure, and federal jurisdictional cases. 46
The alleged benefits of the Tribunal to the federal court system are
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.

S. 645, supra note 5, as amended in the Senate Judiciary Committee, designates a three-year
term for Tribunal judges. H.R. 1970 designates a term of "not more than five years". H.R.
1970, supra note 5, §§ 2(a), 61(a)(1).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 17.
See Leventhal, supra note 25, at 914-15; cf. Coleman Remarks, supra note 26, at 35.
See, e.g., Hearings on HR. 1970, supra note 35, at 11-12, (statement of Leo Levin).
H. Miller,A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228, 235-36 (1975).
Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, has estimated that a
full-time, seven-judge panel of the Tribunal could hand down about 150 decisions annually.
He points out, though, that Chief Justice Burger foresees a temporary panel that would decide only about 50 cases a year, the rough equivalent necessary to reduce the number of
decisions issued by the Supreme Court to a hundred a year. Hellman, Caseload,Conflicts,
and DecisionalCapacity. Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 29 n. 41 and
accompanying text (1983). Very few of the 35-50 cases referred to the Tribunal from the
Supreme Court's current docket would be tax conflicts. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 309 (1982) (showing that of 167 decisions handed down by the Court in
198 1, only four were tax cases, and only three of those did not involve a constitutional question.) Proponents of the Tribunal suggest, however, that many tax cases now denied review
by the Supreme Court will be referred to the Tribunal. Estimates of the quantity of tax cases
that the Tribunal will hear, then, vary with estimates of the number of tax cases which currently are denied (or do not seek) Supreme Court review and which would "float up" to the
Tribunal. See, e.g., Hruska Commission Hearings,supra note 7, at 185-86 (testimony of K.
Martin Worthy, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue and John B. Jones, Jr. estimating
50 tax cases would be decided by the proposed national court of appeals).
Hruska Commission Hearings, supra note 7, at 186 (testimony of K. Martin Worthy and John
B. Jones, Jr. explaining that the intercircuit panel "would have the capacity to handle a
substantial number of other cases, and thus would not be only a tax court, explicitly") (emphasis added).
Compare H. Miller, supra note 43, at 241, with Lumbard, he NationalCourt ofAppeals."Is it
Necessary?, 32 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 111 (1977) (both sources include patent cases which, of
course, are now the province of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See discussion
supra note 12).
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by now familiar. The Tribunal would enlarge the federal courts' capacity to render nationally binding decisions and thereby reduce uncertainty and increase uniformity among circuits. The Tribunal would
alleviate the Supreme Court's burden of deciding many intercircuit
conflicts and ultimately reduce the amount of litigation and delay inherent in the present structure.47
Many of these purported benefits, however, pale upon closer analysis. The lengthy process which tax litigants must endure to reach the
Intercircuit Tribunal for a decision on the merits may even increase the
delay inherent in present tax litigation. Assuming a tax case manages
to wind its way from the trial level to the circuit court level, appeal to
the Supreme Court must still be sought through a discretionary writ of
certiorari. The Supreme Court may deny certiorari, summarily dispose
of the case, hear the case on its merits, or refer it to the Intercircuit
Tribunal.4 8 If referred to the Tribunal and unless the appeal is
mandatory or unless the Supreme Court so directs, the Tribunal may
49
either decline to hear the case or consent to hear it on the merits.
Regardless of the action taken by the Tribunal, further appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court always exists, adding yet another layer of
appellate procedural process.5 ° Any apparent reduction in the quantum
of tax litigation through the use of the Tribunal is mitigated by the
increased time required for individual conflict resolution.5 '
A SPECIALIZED COURT OF TAX APPEALS

As with proposals for a national court of appeals, proposals for a
specialized court of tax appeals have a long lineage.52 Equally as long,
53
if not longer, has been the vehement opposition to such proposals.
47.

48.
49.
50.

5I.
52.

53.

See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 39.
Swygert, The ProposedNational Court ofAppeals: A Threat to JudicialSymmetry, 51 IND.
L.J. 323, 329 (1976).
Id
Appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari is available to litigants in all cases referred to the
Tribunal, thus, the chances are good that the losing party will generally file a certiorari petition, having come that far already. Even if the Supreme Court only rarely grants certiorari
to Tribunal cases, as proponents claim will be the case, the Court must still review each and
every petition. See Diagram 2.
There are also possible constitutional and procedural problems with the altered precedential
effect of a subsequent denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court after the Tribunal had disposed of a case. See Swygert, supra note 48, at 332.
See generally Griswold, The Need/or a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944);
Caplin & Brown, A New United States Court of Tax Appeals, S678, 57 TAXES 360 (1979);
Del Cotto, The Needfor a Court of Tax Appeals. An Argument and a Study, 12 BUFFALO L.
REV. 5 (1962); Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, 70 A.B.A. J. 74
(1984); Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term, (pt. II), 87 U. PA. L. REV. 165,
200 (1938); H. Miller, supra note 43, at 228.
See generally R. Miller, Can Tax Appeals be Centralized?, 23 TAXES 303 (1945); R. Miller,
The Courts of Last Resort in Tax Cases: A Specialized Court of Tax 4ppeals?, 40 A.B.A. J.
563 (1954); A.B.A. Section of Taxation, 70 A.B.A. REP. 144 (1945) (resolution formally opposing the establishment of a Court of Tax Appeals); FREUND COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 23, reprintedin 57 F.R.D. 585-86; HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 234; Remmlein, Tax Controversies - Where Goes the Time?, 13 GEO.
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Justice Traynor's initial proposal in 193814 was "engulfed in opposition."55 Other scholars, including Professor Erwin Griswold, 56 former
Solicitor General of the United States, have advocated an appellate tax
court to sit at the geographic courts of appeals and
57 review all district
court, Tax Court, and Court of Claims decisions.
The reasons advanced for a specialized appellate tax court are not
new, and mirror many of the justifications cited for a national court of
appeals.5 8 The desirability of a specialized tax court has increased,
however, as the problems underlying its inception have grown acute. 59
The flow of cases into the courts of appeals must be reduced to effect any lasting solution to the workload crisis at all levels of the federal
judiciary. 6° A specialized court of tax appeals would divert tax appeals
originating in the district courts, Tax Court, and Claims Court from the
overburdened circuit courts of appeals to a single appellate tax court
(see Diagram 3). Appeals from this court would lie to the Supreme
Court on certiorari. The most recent attempt to enact an appellate tax
court was the Tax Court Improvement Act of 1979.61 Though the bill
was defeated, the proposed court's structure is useful for analysis.
Provisionally named the United States Court of Tax Appeals, this
court would have exclusive jurisdiction over civil tax appeals arising
out of the district courts, Tax Court, and Claims Court.6 2 The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court would designate one judge from each
WASH. L. REV. 416 (1945); Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 238 (1948).

54. Traynor, Administrative andJudicialProcedureforFederalIncome, Estate and Gift Taxes - A
Criticism and a Proposal,38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1938); Traynor and Surrey, New Roads
Toward the Settlement of FederalIncome, Estate and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 336 (1940).
55. Griswold, supra note 52, at 1184.
56. See Griswold, supra note 52.
57. The Court of Claims no longer exists; it has been merged into the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and the trial level Court of Claims is now substantially embodied in the U.S.
Claims Court. See discussion, supra note 12.
58. The specialized appellate tax court is specifically designed to reduce caseloads, conflicts and
uncertainty in the tax field, while the national court of appeals seeks to aid the entire federal
court system.
59. The same structural defects in the tax system have created unrest in the tax field for years;
however, many changes have occurred outside the law which have exacerbated the conflicts,
delay and uncertainty resulting from those defects.
The problems we now face have resulted from the growth of the country, changes in
science and engineering, the increasing complexity of society, the increasing complexity of the structure of business and industry, the enlargement of rights of individuals,
changes in the relationships of people to government, and underlying all this, the
great and increasing litigiousness of our people who historically have a passion for
"taking to the Law."
Burger, supra note 1, at 449.
60. See Friendly,Avertingthe Flood by Lesseningthe Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 657 (1974);
Griswold, Helping the Supreme Court by Reducing the Fow of Cases into the Courts ofAppeals, 67 JUDICATURE 59-60 (1983).
61. S. 1691, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 11,656 (1979); S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. 9,121 (1979). For a detailed analysis of the proposal, see generally REPORT
ON 1979 TAX COURT BILL, supra note 22.
62. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., DESCRIPTION
OF S. 1961 at 2 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
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circuit court of appeals to sit on the Court of Tax Appeals for a threeyear term.6 3 The court would normally sit in panels of three or more
judges, and would sit en banc to hear any case in which at least six
judges believed the case to be of extraordinary importance. 6' Each
judge would additionally be expected to maintain a partial caseload in
his own circuit.6 5 Though permanently housed in Washington, D.C.,
the court would "ride circuit", visiting each circuit at least once a year
to resolve tax appeals. 6 The Supreme Court might review the Court of
Tax Appeal's decisions by a writ of certiorari, but such writs are
granted only in rare instances.6 7 The Court of Tax Appeals, for all
practical purposes, would be the final arbiter in non-constitutional tax
cases.

68

Even to those with no conceptual difficulties with a specialized tax
court, the proposal had several significant drawbacks: the shifting
composition of the court,69 the practice of riding circuit,7" the failure of
the proposal to eliminate forum shopping by the government 7 and to
address the treatment of tax issues arising in non-tax cases, 72 and the
exclusion of Court of Claims' (now U.S. Claims Court) appeals from
the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.7 3 Any new bill proposing

a Court of Tax Appeals would have to resolve these problems to merit

Id at 5.
Caplin & Brown, supra note 52, at 363.
See REPORT ON 1979 TAx COURT BILL, supra note 22, at 7.
Id at 8.
Id at 7.
See 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 37-38 (testimony of Maurice Rosenberg,
former Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, Department of Justice).
69. Many of those who testified at the Tax Court Hearings took issue with the bill's proposed
court composition of temporarily assigned judges, shifting panels of short duration, and the
requirement that judges maintain a dual caseload. They recommended a permanent panel
of judges for the court. See, e.g., 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 26-27 (testimony of John M. Samuels, Tax Legislation Counsel, Department of Treasury); id. at 36-37
(testimony of Maurice Rosenberg); id at 57-58 (testimony of Mortimer Caplin); id at 95-97
(testimony of Randolph W. Thrower, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
70. See REPORT ON THE 1979 TAx COURT BILL, supra note 22, at 25-26.
71. Id at 14-15.
72. 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 39 (testimony of Maurice Rosenberg).
73. See REPORT ON THE 1979 TAx COURT BILL, supra note 22, at 7 n.8 (stating that the omission
of a clause in S. 1691 abolishing the Court of Claims jurisdiction over tax cases was apparently an oversight, because otherwise the proposed Court of Tax Appeals would not have
jurisdiction over all tax appeals). Regardless of the reason for the omission, the jurisdiction
of the old Court of Claims, which included both trial and appellate authority, now rests with
the new U.S. Claims Court at the trial level, and with the new Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit at the appellate level. See discussion, supra note 12.
The issue which must be addressed in any subsequent court of tax appeals bills, then, is
what to do with U.S. Claims Court appeals? Obviously, any jurisdiction over tax appeals not
resting with a Court of Tax Appeals will mitigate the beneficial effects of installing such a
court; alternative litigation routes encourage forum shopping. The relatively small number
of tax cases which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit currently hears could multiply rapidly if that court handed down decisions in favor of taxpayers which conflicted with
decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. Corporate taxpayers, or rather tax lawyers, have
considerable experience in shopping for the most favorable forum in which to litigate their
issue.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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DIAGRAM 3
TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION AND ROUTES OF APPEAL IN TAX LITIGATION
UPON ENACTMENT OF A COURT OF TAX APPEALS

~(PROPOSED)

Appea,
Courts
Trial Courts

SOURCE: REPORT ON THE

1979

TAX COURT BILL

serious consideration.7 4
Both the Intercircuit Tribunal and the Court of Tax Appeals purport to resolve many of the problems inherent in tax litigation. These
problems emanate primarily from two sources: the structure of tax litigation and the lack of uniform and coherent application of tax laws.75
74.

75.

The following salient features of a new court of tax appeals are essential to its proper functioning, and should not be compromised in the enactment of any proposal for such a court.
(1) The composition of the Court should consist of a permanent panel of seven or nine
judges, sitting substantially en banc, chosen from the ranks of current courts of appeals judges, or from Tax Court, district court, and U.S. Claims Court judges. History demonstrates that this type of court requires additional and expensive judicial
appointments, which makes it politically distasteful. It is paramount, however, that
the very purpose of the court's creation, to promote stability and certainty in tax law,
not be undermined by crippling the judges of the court with short terms and dual
caseloads.
1979 Tax CourtHearings, supra note 21, at 37-39 (testimony of Maurice Rosenberg). No less
than five-to-seven year terms will accomplish this purpose. The caseload estimates for a court
of tax appeals leave little doubt that a judge of that court could not be expected to carry an
additional caseload on another court. See Del Cotto, supra note 52, at 32 (estimating in 1962
that 340 cases would be decided after hearing or submission by a court of tax appeals); H.
Miller, supra note 52, at 244 (estimating in 1975 about 500 annual case filings in a court of
tax appeals). Several witnesses at the 1979 Tax Court Hearings recommended seven judges
as an appropriate number for a court of tax appeals, although nine may be required to allow
the court to expeditiously dispose of its caseload. See 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note
21.
(2) The jurisdiction of the court should encompass all civil tax appeals, including U.S.
Claims Court appeals. It may also be prudent to devise a method of certification of
complex or noveau tax issues arising in nontax cases in the other courts of appeals,
such as bankruptcy and collection cases.
1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 37-39. See discussion, supra note 73.
A structural realignment of the present system would not affect one of the main contributors
to the problems inherent in tax litigation, the Internal Revenue Code. The proliferation of
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A closer analysis of the actual effect of both proposed courts on the
problems generated by the defective tax litigation system, such as government relitigation, forum shopping, and actual and potential intercircuit conflicts, will bring the relative merits of each court into better
focus.
GOVERNMENT RELITIGATION AND FORUM SHOPPING

The present structure of federal tax litigation encourages both government relitigation and forum shopping. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy of relitigating issues adversely decided in another
forum aggravates the uncertainty resulting from a lack of nationally
binding tax decisions.7 6 The tax structure encourages duplicative litigation by providing multiple forums in which to litigate an issue. Paul
Carrington, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, conducted
a study of appeals by the IRS and concluded:
[The IRS] is quite prepared to continue to litigate in other circuits a
question that had been resolved in only one; even in the same circuit,
the United States may be willing to re-litigate an issue if minor factual
distinctions can be made between a pending matter and a preceding
decision.7 7
In addition, the IRS only seeks certiorari to the Supreme Court in cases
where the facts especially favor its own position.78 The government's
refusal to acquiesce to decisions of the circuit courts of appeals underlies the uncertain precedential value of such decisions and burdens
both courts and taxpayers with unnecessary litigation.
The corporate taxpayer also engages in forum shopping, attempting

76.
77.

78.

code provisions, treasury regulations, revenue rulings, and case law interpreting tax laws has
increased the complexity of taxation beyond the expertise of the average taxpayer, lawyer
and judge. In Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974), Justice Douglas, in
his dissent, commented on the complexity of the tax laws:
This Court has, to many, seemed particularly ill-equipped to resolve income tax disputes between the Commissioner and the taxpayers. The reasons are (1) that the field
has become increasingly technical and complicated due to the expansions of the Code
and the proliferation of decisions, and (2) that we seldom see enough of them to
develop any expertise in the area. Indeed, we are called upon mostly to resolve conflicts between the Circuits which more providently should go to the standing committee of the Congress for resolution.
Underlying this problem is the frequency of legislative revision of the tax code. Within the
past eight years alone, 3,156 subsections of the tax code have been revised by Congress.
Approximately 198 tax bills are presently pending before Congress. This flood of tax legislation makes it impossible to digest and understand the tax laws.
This note does not address reform of the Code, an altogether separate problem, but
rather, it focuses on structural reform of the present judicial system. Elimination of the
problems inherent in tax litigation requires both structural reform and reform of the present
Code.
See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 349-54.
Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Case.- A Field and StatisticalStudy, 11 Hous. L.
REV. 1101, 1104 (1974).
See generally HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 76. See also Hellman, supra note
44, at 36 n. 29.
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to litigate an issue in the forum most favorable to his position.7 9 The
liberal jurisdiction and venue rules followed in federal tax litigation
permit both the taxpayer and the government a choice of a variety of
courts in which to file suit. 80
The enactment of an Intercircuit Tribunal would not address the
causes of government relitigation and forum shopping: multiple forums of entry, a semi-independent Tax Court, and the segmented
courts of appeals. The Tribunal would merely absorb the excess litigation spawned by such practices.
A Court of Tax Appeals, however, would eradicate the causes of
government relitigation and forum shopping by unifying all tax appeals in a single appellate court. Although existing multiple forums of
entry would remain, the incentive to shop for a favorable forum would
be seriously diminished by the Court of Tax Appeals' direct review of
decisions from all three trial forums. This revised structure would also
bring the Tax Court into line by subjecting it to appellate review by the
Court of Tax Appeals (see Diagram 3).
INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
The United States judicial system has traditionally valued uniformity of national law. "The imperative need for a uniform body of national law underlies the judicial article of the Constitution."'" Indeed,
one of the Supreme Court's most crucial functions is to preserve uniformity of national law among the appellate courts.82 Commenting on
the spurious law of the circuit, Justice Walter B. Schaefer stated that:
Deliberate disregard of the decisions of coordinate United State Courts
of Appeals have become so common that it has achieved a dubious
83
respectability under the euphemistic phrase, 'the law of the circuit.'
Uniformity in tax law is essential because the tax system relies on
self-assessment and because tax consequences are often planned in advance.84 Thus, it is essential that the judicial structure possesses the
79. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 363-68; REPORT ON 1979 TAX COURT
BILL, supra note 22, at 11.
80. REPORT ON 1979 TAX COURT BILL, supra note 22, at 12.
81. Quoting Alexander Hamilton, Justice Walter B. Schaefer provides a historical foundation for
the necessity of uniform law. "The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretations of the
national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over
the same causes arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing
but contradiction and confusion can proceed." Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69
A.B.A. J. 453 (1983) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton)). Although Hamilton
was speaking of thirteen state supreme courts interpreting federal law differently, Schaefer
notes that the principle equally applies to thirteen federal courts of appeals interpreting federal law in thirteen different ways.
82. Evarts Act of 1891, Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat 82.
83. Schaefer, supra note 8 1, at 453.
84. Testifying at the 1979 Tax Court Hearings, Meade Emory, former assistant to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, noted the following:
Predictabilityis required in a self-assessment system. One obvious factor often
overlooked in the debate concerning a national court of tax appeals is that our tax
system imposes an annual obligation on each taxpayer to self-assess his or her tax
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capacity to resolve tax issues in an expedient, competent and authoritative manner. The uncertainty inherent in the present system manifests
itself at the tax planning plateau where taxpayers resolve controverted
issues in their own favorY Ensuring the viability of self-assessment
begins with earning the respect and cooperation of the taxpayer.86 Tax
planners, businessmen, corporations, sole proprietors, and other citizens plan future tax consequences based on current tax law. Uncertainty about current tax law, on the part of both
the taxpayer and the
7
government, hampers effective tax planning.1
The IRS has indicated that compliance with tax laws has decreased
in recent years.8 8 This decrease has been attributed to a loss of respect
for the integrity and legitimacy of the present system.8 9 Mortimer Caplin, former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, refers to the rapid
emergence of an "underground economy" which he defines as "a polite
term for tax evasion." 9° This underground economy consists of unreported and untaxed income. Most of this tax evasion escapes IRS detection due to inadequate IRS manpower and capital resources. 91
Inconsistency in national law and uncertainty regarding the ultimate interpretation of federal legislation thwart the valued tradition of
uniformity. The most dramatic manifestation of this inconsistency and
uncertainty lies in the presence of intercircuit conflicts. 92

85.
86.
87.

liability annually. A system which imposes this obligation on the one hand and neglects, with the other hand, to inform the self-assessing taxpayer what standards are to
apply in that process, should not be regarded as functioning in a proper manner. The
tax law is not a little nook or cranny of technical esoterica. Rather it is, perhaps, the
most pervasive of all aspects of the federal legal thicket. Every taxpayer must, each
year, step to the line and say 'this is my tax.' It ill behooves the federal establishment
to demand this obligation and yet not provide the clear guidelines for meeting that
obligation.
1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 143 (statement of Meade Emory) (emphasis in
original).
Caplin & Brown, supra note 52, at 361-62.
See 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 39-40 (statement of Maurice Rosenberg).
See generally id at 143-46 (statement of Meade Emory).

88.

See generally ANNUAL REPORT, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR YEARS 1970-

89.
90.
91.

1982. Statistics published by the Commissioner indicate a drop in compliance with tax laws.
The 1982 Report indicates that new programs which were established to catch tax invaders
have been moderately successful.
See 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 49.
Id at 44 (statement of Mortimer Caplin).
Testifying at the 1979 Tax Court Hearings, Mortimer Caplin stated that Americans file approximately 90 million individual tax returns every year with only 20,000 I.R.S. agents able
to audit 2 million returns. He concluded that much revenue is lost because it inadequate
resources to police returns. Id at 44. The number of individual tax returns filed has increased to over 95 million. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF COUNSEL OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, at 7 (1983).

92.

Other factors producing uncertainty and the lack of uniformity of the tax laws include the
following: (I) the Internal Revenue Code, see discussion, supra note 75; (2) the government
policy of relitigation, see HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 349-54, see also
Carrington, supra note 77, at 1104; Helman, supra note 44, at 36 n. 29; (3) forum shopping,
see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra notes 62-63 and accompanying

text; (4) divergence between position of Tax Court and the courts of appeals, see Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), afd on other grounds, 455 F. 2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); and (5) the divergence between positions taken by the three
types of trial forums.
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The definition of intercircuit conflicts,9 3 although fugitive in nature,
connotes: ". . . different interpretations of the same rule of national
law, each of equal force within specified territorial limits. '9 4 Different
definitions of the term inevitably lead to different conclusions regarding both the extent and impact of intercircuit conflicts. The definition
of intercircuit conflicts "should include substantial divergences in approach to a common legal problem as well as [an] outright conflict of
holding." '
The study of the extent and impact of intercircuit conflicts is not an
exact science, but one of degree. 96 The subjective element in determining the presence of an intercircuit conflict results in great disparity
among the various estimates of the number of unresolved intercircuit
conflicts at any given time.9 7 Intercircuit tax conflicts have a larger destructive impact on the judicial system than almost any other area of
the law, for "no
other branch of the law touches human activities at so
many points. ' Whatever the actual number of intercircuit tax conflicts, a sufficient number exist to seriously impede the consistency of
federal tax law. 99
The Intercircuit Tribunal establishes a mechanism precisely to resolve intercircuit conflicts, including tax conflicts. While the Tribunal
may ultimately resolve the bulk of these conflicts, the inordinate delay
in resolving them undermines the purpose of the Court's creation. K.
Martin Worthy, former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, in his
testimony before the Hruska Commission, remarked that:
[flor any given litigation there may be literally hundreds of thousands
of cases, or even a million cases, pending on returns, in circuit, or in
suspense, awaiting the final answer on the point. Often, it's not nearly
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.

98.
99.

This note addresses the problems connected with intercircuit conflicts and not the problems
connected with intracircuit conflicts, conflicts among the trial forums, nor conflicts among
the Tax Court and the courts of appeals, which are altogether different inquiries.
HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 217-18.
Id at 221.
Commenting on the nature of conflicts, Justice Frankfurter stated that despite any definition,
questions of degree remain:
What constitutes a conflict? The answer to this question of course, imparts into the
matter the whole of the lawyers' traditional technique of analysis and distinguishing
of cases. The concept is not an exact one. One point may be stressed. The Court is
interested in conflicts which impair uniformity of decision where uniformity is significant [citation omitted], conflicts which its decision in the particular case will remove
[citation omitted]. This rules out, of course, hosts of particularistic applications of
general rules turning upon the analysis of special states of fact [citation omitted]. But
many questions of degree remain.
Frankfurter, Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48 HARV. L. REv. 238, 268-69 (1934).
Meador, A Comment on the ChiefJustice's Proposals, 69 A.B.A. J. 448, 449 (1983).
Estimates vary as to the magnitude of these intercircuit conflicts; they range from as
few as a dozen up to several dozen a year. Whatever the precise magnitude, however,
there seems to be a general agreement that there are a sufficient number of these
conflicts to make worthwhile a mechanism for resolving them and that a mechanism
does not exist in the overloaded Supreme Court. Compare the findings of the Hruska
Commission Report, supra note 24, at 221 and app. B, concerning the number of conflicts with G. CASPER & R. POSNER, The Workload of the Supreme Court 89-91 (1976).
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1945).
See infra note 103.
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as important as how the point is resolved, as that it be
° ° resolved with
reasonable promptness and with reasonable finality."

While the Tribunal provides greater appellate review of tax conflicts than the Supreme Court presently provides, the underlying problem-interpretation of tax issues by multiple courts of appeals-still
exists.' 0 1 Removing circuit court jurisdiction over tax cases and vesting
court of tax appeals would eliminate inthis jurisdiction in a single
02
tercircuit tax conflicts.'
A court of tax appeals would produce definitive resolutions of many
tax conflicts which require national attention but are currently ignored. i0 3 The quantum of tax litigation would eventually decline as
increasing numbers of tax conflicts were resolved. An expert appellate
tax court would develop a more stable body of tax law through a consistent approach to interpretation of the internal revenue laws. 04 This
consistency facilitates tax planning and the taxpayer self-assessment
process.
Some scholars argue that benefits are derived from the "percolation" of issues among the various circuits. 0 5 Percolation provides each
circuit court with an opportunity to reconsider an issue already decided
by another circuit free of the constraints of the doctrine of stare decisis.1° Theoretically this rehashing provides the Supreme Court with
the benefit of a variety of views on an issue while preserving regional
differences.'° 7The taxpayer and the courts, however, bear the cost of
this benefit through delay in the resolution of national law.'0 8 The
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.

107.
108.

Hruska Commission Hearings,supra note 7, at 179.
See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
Ernest Griswold amplified this in 1979:
[Tihere are a great many cases clearly worthy of review which the Supreme Court is
simply unable to take and one consequence is that we have now in this country a
massive system of discretionary justice. . . . By establishing a Court of Tax Appeals,
we will provide a court, below the Supreme Court, which can make decisions which
are nationally binding on federal tax cases ....
1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 18, 25 (testimony of Ernest Griswold).
See REPORT ON 1979 TAx COURT BILL, supra note 22, at 25. See also discussion supra note
75.
Stevens, supra note 1, at 183. See also 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 107-12
(statement of Charles M. Walker).
The present system beneficially permits a seriatim consideration of difficult tax questions. Assistant Attorney General Ferguson puts it best when he speaks of the present
systems as providing an opportunity for reconsideration of an issue already decided by
one circuit by another appellate court free of the constraints of the doctrine of stare
decisis.
1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 150-51 (testimony of Meade Emory) (quoting
Ferguson, JurisdictionalProblems in Tax Controversies, 48 IowA L. REv. 312, 381 (1963)).
Id. at 154-56.
See id at 151. Opponents of a specialized court of tax appeals argue that the Supreme Court
is a sufficient mechanism to provide uniformity of national tax law. Often, however, many
years pass before the Supreme Court grants certiorari to provide a nationally binding precedent. In the interim, the taxpayer bears the cost of this delay in final ajudication of the tax
law. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. The following chart indicates the delay
period in final ajudication of tax conflict cases (not involving constitutional questions) decided by the Supreme Court during the October terms of 1980 and 1981.
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presence of conflicting circuit decisions causes taxpayers in separate
circuits to receive different treatment with regard to the same issue of
law. 109 In 1979, Professor Griswold warned that percolation of issues
results in "continuing uncertainty, encouragement of litigation, and a
premium on continued litigation.""
Percolation does not necessarily produce better-reasoned tax opinions." The benefit to taxpayers of expedient and authoritative rulings
on tax issues would outweigh any purported benefits gained from a
lengthy percolation process.
The Intercircuit Tribunal does not discourage percolation of issues
among the separate court of appeals; rather, it attempts to resolve conflicts by creating an additional appellate level. The establishment of a
court of tax appeals would eliminate percolation of issues at the court
of appeals level but allow for differences among the trial forums. This
would shorten the percolation period for tax cases.
The uncertainty flowing from existing conflicts is augmented by the
uncertainty created by potential conflicts-those that are anticipated

TERM

CASE

ISSUE FIRST LITIGATED

DELAY
PERIOD

October
1980

Commissioner v. Portland Cement
Co. of Utah, 450 U.S. 156 (1981)

White Wall Cement Manufacturing
Co., v. U.S.
237 F. Supp. 838 (1965)

16 years

October
1980

U.S. v. Swank
451 U.S. 571 (1981)

Mullins v. Commissioner
48 T.C. 571 (1967)

13 years

October
1980

Rowan v. U.S.
452 U.S. 247 (1981)

Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. U.S.
179 Ct. Cl. 944 (1967)

14 years

October
1981

U.S. v. Vogel Fertilizer
455 U.S. 16 (1982)

T.L. Hunt
35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966 (1976)

6 years

October
1981

Jewett v. Commissioner
455 U.S. 305 (1982)

Keinath v. Commissioner
58 T.C. 352 (1972)

10 years

October
1981

Diedtrich v. Commissioner
457 U.S. 191 (1982)

Turner v. Commissioner
49 T.C. 356 (1968)

14 years

109. 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 68 (statement of Mortimer Caplin).
See, e.g., Doehring v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1974-234, 33 T.C.M. 1035 (1974)
and Puckett v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1974-235, 33 T.C.M. 1038 (1974) two related
cases involving the identical issue and the same corporation. The first held for the
government, adopting the rationale favored by the Tax Court, as there was no controlling contrary precedent in the Eighth Circuit where the case would normally be
appealed. In the second, however, the court felt obliged to rule for the taxpayer because an appeal from the case would be made to the Fifth Circuit, which had previously established a controlling precedent. In reluctantly deciding for the taxpayer in
Puckett, Judge Fay, who wrote both opinions stated "We hasten to add that this decision does not reflect the thinking of this Court on the issue resolved hereby."
110. 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 24 (statement of Erwin Griswold).
I am sure that the burden on the courts in this country would be considerably reduced
if we had a system which would enable lawyers, both private and public, and judges
of the lower courts, to know somewhat more definitively than is now the case what the
law is.
111. See 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 79-81 (statement of Mortimer Caplin), at
150-54 (statement of Meade Emory). See also Schaefer, supra note 81, at 453.
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but have not yet manifested themselves in outright conflict. Although
some scholars have downplayed the significance of potential conflicts," 2' the Hruska Commission noted:
The lack of capacity for the definitive declaration of national law frequently results in uncertainty even though a conflict never develops.
The possibility of a conflict, not knowing when a potential conflict will
mature into an actual conflict, is yet another consequence of our present system. In many cases there are years of uncertainty during which
hundreds, sometimes thousands of individuals are
3 left in doubt as to
what rule will be applied to their transactions.''
The uncertainty regarding the ultimate meaning of the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code results in an inefficient and unproductive
allocation of resources by both taxpayers and the Federal
Government. 114
The Intercircuit Tribunal would have a de minimis effect in discouraging potential conflicts. The possibility that courts of appeals
may interpret identical tax provisions differently breeds potential conflicts. The Intercircuit Tribunal does little to alter the structure which
creates potential conflicts, other than to superimpose another court to
resolve them." 5 The Tribunal's failure to reduce the development of
potential conflicts would encourage actual conflicts to develop and result in a higher general level of uncertainty.
A specialized court of tax appeals would eliminate many of the
causes of potential conflicts and uncertainty by routing all tax appeals
directly to a single court. Resolution of most tax conflicts and areas of
uncertainty at the court of appeals level would reduce the lengthy "conflict resolution period"," 6 which currently provides fertile ground for
divergent interpretations
of Internal Revenue Code statutes and
7
regulations.'1
112. See Wallace, supra note 3, at 926; Hellman, supra note 44, at 36.
113. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 24, at 219.
114. Daniel J. Meador, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, stated that "[u]ncertainty
about the ultimate meaning to be given statutory provisions can make the work of lawyers
and administrators difficult and more costly to the government." Meador, A Comment on the
Chief Jusice's Proposals, 69 A.B.A. J. 448, 449 (1983).
115. See Diagram 2.
116. See Del Cotto, supra note 52, at 30.
117. This note has identified factors which cause uncertainty in the tax field and it has examined
their effects on the tax litigation system in a vacuum. A specific case study, an examination
of the history of income tax consequences of conditional gifts, highlights the problems confronting the tax litigation system and places them in perspective. In 1982, the United States
Supreme Court in Diedtrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) held that a donor of a
conditional gift received taxable income to the extent that the gift tax paid by donee exceeds
the donor's adjusted basis in the property transferred. In short, the donor received income
and assumed a tax liability.
This issue was first litigated in 1968 in Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968). The
Tax Court, applying a donative intent analysis, held that the transfer produced no taxable
income to the donor. This decision was affirmed per curiam by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, afl'dpercuriam 710 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). Five years later the government
relitigated the same issue in Johnson v. Commissioner 59 T.C. 791 (1973), and persuaded the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to reject the Turner donative intent analysis and apply
a part-sale part-gift analysis which resulted in income to the donor 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.),
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TAX SPECIALIZATION

The recent enactment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

18

and the success of other specialized courts"19 indicate that the

validity of traditional arguments against specialization has considerably lessened."2 ' Critics of specialization have often excepted the area of
taxation because of its unique statutory nature and the absence of demonstrable benefits from the percolation of issues among the circuits.' 2 ' Mortimer Caplin recently stated that "[c]areful analysis
strongly indicates that the dangers of over-specialization have been exaggerated and that, on balance, a court of tax appeals would be best
22
served by judges who are to some degree specialists in tax matters." 1
Proponents of the Intercircuit Tribunal emphasize that Tribunal
judges would develop an expertise in statutory interpretation through
frequent exposure to tax cases.' 23 Through the use of rotating panels of
circuit judges and a caseload encompassing multiple areas of federal
statutory law, the Tribunal attempts to retain the concepts of generalist
courts and generalist judges which are considered essential to main24
taining a leavening effect between tax and other areas of the law.1
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974). The Sixth Circuit did not overrule Turner due to a varying fact pattern, but this discrepancy formed an intracircuit conflict for which the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
One year later in Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 309 (1974) the government relitigated
the same issue and although the government urged that the Tax Court apply the Johnson
part-sale part-gift analysis, the Tax Court applied the Turner donative intent analysis based
on stare decisis. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision on appeal 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
Four years later in Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 780 (1979), the Tax Court
was again faced with this same issue and applied the Johnson part-gift part-sale analysis.
The Tax Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 634
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980). Despite an intercircuit conflict between the Sixth, Second, and
Fourth Circuits, the government refused to seek certiorari.
In both Diedtrich v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1979) and in Grant v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1088 (1980), the Tax Court held that no income was attributable to the donor of a conditional gift. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit consolidated these two cases on appeal and reversed the Tax Court's decision by
applying the Johnson part-gift part-sale analysis. 643 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1981).
Finally, fourteen years after the issue was first litigated, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to eliminate the intercircuit conflict and provide a nationally binding decision, 457 U.S.
191 (1982). The Court rejected the Turner donative-intent analysis and affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit by concluding that the donor of a conditional gift received
income.
118. See discussion supra note 12.
119. Two examples are the United States Court of Military Appeals and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. See Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 805-06 nn. 54-57 (1983).

120. See 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 150-60 (statement of Meade Emory).
121. Posner, supra note 27, at 782.
I therefore question whether the usual arguments for the division of labor have much
force applied to subject-matter specialization by courts except in a handful of areas
where the legal experts are generally accepted to be objective. Federal tax and government contract law may be such areas; the Tax Court and the Court of Claims [sic]
are well regarded.
122. Caplin & Brown, supra note 52, at 363.
123. See Leventhal, supra note 25, at 914.
124. It is also said that the deflection of complex tax cases not raising constitutional issues would
permit the Supreme Court to focus its energies on cases more crucial to the proper function-
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While Tribunal judges would develop an increased familiarity with
tax law, their knowledge would be in coming "up to snuff" in the field
rather than acquiring a substantial tax background enabling them to
contribute to the development of tax law. Tribunal judges would simultaneously hear non-tax cases, delaying their familiarization with
tax law. 2 5 Ironically, the proposed three-year term for Intercircuit Tribunal judges would force a judge to leave the court at approximately
the time he has become competent to contribute to cohesive and progressive tax law.' 26 Furthermore, the present Intercircuit Tribunal proposals, with shifting panels of circuit judges carrying dual caseloads,
attempts to maintain the concept of generalist judges. Critics of this
staffing method assert that the random panels of Tribunal judges contribute to the instability and uncertainty which the Tribunal is designed
to alleviate. 27 This instability and uncertainty could be avoided by
altering the composition of the Court to consist of seven or nine permanent judges, 2 8 although this sacrifices the concept of generalist judges.
Also, the Tribunal's caseload would consist largely of statutory interpretation in complex,
highly regulated areas; a diet inconsistent with a
29
generalist court.
By staffing the Tribunal with shifting panels of judges and providing it with a specialized caseload, proponents of the Tribunal have simultaneously failed to take full advantage of the benefits of
specialization and foresworn the benefits of a generalist court. The Intercircuit Tribunal is, in effect, a poorly designed speciality court and
an example of a legislatively forged compromise which could prove
disastrous if enacted.
An often-voiced objection against specialized courts is that such

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

ing of the nation's courts. If it is assumed, however, that the existence of the Tribunal would
encourage more appeals in tax cases, the Justices would spend more of their time screening
appeals to determine whether to deny certiorari, hear the case, or refer it to the Tribunal. See
supra notes 48 to 51 and accompanying text. In addition, the Justices would have to consider
second petitions for certiorari for all appeals from actions of the Tribunal, whether or not the
Tribunal decides the merits of the case. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra note 45.
Judge Leventhal recommended that the Tribunal judges be assigned for substantial terms of
five to seven years. See Leventhal, supra note 25, at 911.
See Hearingson HR 1970, supra note 35, at 5-7 (statement of Daniel J. Meador).
See discussion supra note 69.
Judge Posner speaks of a distinction between specialization of function and specialization of
subject matter. The judges of the Tribunal would develop, as a result of a caseload consisting largely of federal statutory cases in a limited number of areas, specialization in the function of statutory interpretation. The subject matter would vary, so the court would not be a
specialized court, such as a tax court, but rather a court which 'specialized' in the resolution
of statutory conflicts and interpretation problems. See Posner, supra note 27, at 778. For
example, the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is generally considered a specialized subject-matter court, despite its merging the two specialized areas of patent law and
government claims appeals (including tax cases). Similarly, the Intercircuit Tribunal would
be more a specialized court than a generalist court, despite the fact that it will hear cases
from a variety of disciplines, because its diet will consist largely of questions of federal statutory interpretation. "[Tlhe advantages of decision-making by generalist judges diminish as
the judges' exposure to varied areas of the law is lessened." HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 24, at 235.
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court will lose sight of regional considerations because it has subjectmatter jurisdiction, rather than geographic jurisdiction. 130 Theoretically, a tax court centered in Washington, D.C., whether or not "riding
circuit", could not adequately appreciate the special considerations inherent in tax decisions which sometimes justify disparate treatment
among taxpayers residing in different circuits. 31 This argument has
little relevance today with the present roulette system of tax litigation
involving multiple courts of entry and appellate courts which often
carry tax problems far from their geographical origin. 3 2 In fact, the
enactment of either an Intercircuit Tribunal or a Court of Tax Appeals
would not structurally affect the present system in regard to the geographical district courts or the already specialized Tax Court and
Claims Court. 33 Presently, most tax appeals originate in the Tax
Court, a specialized court with no unique competency in matters of
local law.' 34 If preserving regional differences is desirable, the remedy
lies in tightening jurisdiction and venue provisions, 35 not in opposing
the enactment of a Court of Tax Appeals. Furthermore, the creation of
such a court will obviate many of the reasons corporate taxpayers and
the government engage in forum shopping.
The Freund Commission recognized as early as 1972 that otherwise
valid arguments against specialization may be misleading within the
area of taxation.
[A] case might be made for a specialized administrative court of appeals, national in scope, in one or more fields. Federal taxation, because of the complexity of the subject, the volume of litigation, and the
urgent need to resolve uncertainties and conflicts in the interest of both
taxpayers and Treasury, may be deemed 36a particularly appropriate
subject for a specialized court of appeals.'
CONCLUSION
The numerous and recurring proposals for a new appellate tax
court over the past fifty years have all met an untimely death, in large
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See, e.g., id; Schaefer, supra note 81, at 454 (1983).
See 1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 154.
Id at 155.
See Diagrams 2 and 3.
See 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 156.
This raises a critical issue which ultimately will have to be addressed: whether the number of
trial forums for tax cases should be reduced. One alternative would be to require all federal
tax litigation to commence in the Tax Court, although this would remove taxation from the
generalized court system. Martin Ginsburg, Professor of Law, at Georgetown University
Law Center, stated recently:
Replacing the present trifurcated trial system with a single specialist court of firstinstance tax jurisdiction would further promote uniformity of interpretation and decision. But the issues here are more turbulent. . . . A cautious champion will reserve
consideration of the trial level for another day and focus on revamping the appellate
system.
Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 77.
136. FREUND COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 585.
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part due to the strong opposition of the organized tax bar.137 The Tax
Section of the New York State Bar Association was the first to break
tradition and publicly support a unified appellate tax court in 1972,38
and again in 1979.139 Other bar associations have since joined in the
call for such a court." 4 The major historical justification cited by the
American Bar Association for opposing a court of tax appeals concerns
the effect of specialization of courts and judges on the development of
tax law, 4 ' and the "drastic" nature of the structural reform in relation
to the problems in federal tax litigation.'4 2 Predictably, however, critics of a court of tax appeals have recently acknowledged the urgency of
the problem and the need for change, but still disagree as to the proper
solution.' 4 3 The Tax Section of the American Bar Association now
137. See Miller, supra note 43, at 230-33 (describing the immediate and forceful opposition of the
Tax Section of the ABA to Professor Griswold's 1944 proposal for a court of tax appeals).
The ABA also opposed the enactment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982. See Wallace, supra note 3, at 933 n. 88 and accompanying text. Some observers have
intimated that part of the resistance of the tax bar to proper structural reform may be motivated by a desire to preserve the benefits which a dysfunctional tax structure holds for those
who are best acquainted with its crooked paths. Cf. 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21,
at 39-40 (Maurice Rosenberg analogizing the tax system to a pinball game); id at 48 (Donald
Alexander, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, referring to "gamesplaying" by tax
practitioners, that is forum shopping). If such is the case it gives cause for concern for at
least two reasons. First, it suggests that tax practitioners feel threatened by such a court, as if
all their accumulated skill and experience with the idiosyncracies of the tax structure would
suddenly become useless if such a court was created. This fear is at best a misapprehension
of the utility of tax practicioners in the overall tax field. At worst, it is completely ungrounded. Certaintly enough complexity and confusion remains in the tax system to challenge the best tax lawyers. Second, court reform in any area of the law should not be
impeded by those who possess a vested interest in the present system if maintaining that
interest is a prime motivation for resistance to change. Further discussion of this topic can be
found at 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 302 (New York State Bar Association
Tax Section Report).
138. In 1972, the Committee on Tax Policy of the New York State Bar Association issued a report
to the Executive Committee of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association
clearly supporting the creation of a court of tax appeals. See Roberts, Friedman, Ginsburg,
A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 327 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Complexity Report]. The Executive Committee approved the report "in various respects" in
May of 1972. See 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 289.
139. In 1979, the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association submitted a report to the
Subcommittee on Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary strongly
urging the establishment of a United States Court of Tax Appeals. See 1979 Tax Court
Hearings, supra note 21, at 250, 251.
140. See id at 289. The Complexity Report was endorsed by the State Bar of Texas (Tax Section)
on Mar. 23, 1973, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on April 12, 1973, and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Federal Tax Division) on Dec. 6,
1973. Id The Oregon State Bar Association (Tax Section) endorsed a Court of Tax Appeals
on Sept. 26, 1979. See id at 235 (Letter from G. Goldstein on behalf of the Tax Section of
the Oregon State Bar Association to Senator Max Baucus, D-Mont.).
141. See Hruska Commission Hearings, supra note 7, at 180 (testimony of K. Martin Worthy,
Chairman of the Section of Taxation of the ABA, citing the most frequently expressed reason
for voting down a court of tax appeals as a desire "to preserve the right of review by a local
generalist court.").
142. 1979 Tax Court Hearings,supra note 21, at 108. "Surely before trying to rearrange or adjust
the system to remedy this so-called evil in the intercircuit conflicts, we should try to find out
if the system is really not working properly." (testimony of Charles M. Walker, on behalf of
the Section of Taxation of the ABA).
143. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 3, at 932-34. Judge Wallace agreed that reform is necessary,
and that the proponents of a national court of appeals "have not proved their case," but
rejected the specialized courts except in "areas of the laws in which unacceptable conflict,

19841

A New Court of Tax Appeals

supports the Intercircuit Tribunal bills currently under consideration in
various congressional committees'" as the only acceptable structural
tax reform. 145 This note, as well as other recent articles,' 46 has demonstrated that the proposed Intercircuit Tribunal/national court of appeals structure is "an inadequate response to the defects in the present
system of appellate tax justice."' 147 A new United States Court of Tax
Appeals should be enacted as an initial step in cleaning up the long
neglected tax litigation system.
J Patrick Galvi, Jr.*
PeterJ.Relly **

144.
145.
146.
147.
*
**

together with other significant and decisive factors, produces an intolerable burden on both
the federal judiciary and the parties subject to confficting rules." Judge Wallace did not view
taxation as an area suitable for a specialized court.
See S.645 and H.R. 1970, supra note 5.
See Hruska Commission Hearings,supra note 7, at 180-81 (testimony of K. Martin Worthy).
See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 3, at 932; Handler, supra note 3, at 19-20.
1979 Tax Court Hearings, supra note 21, at 314 (conclusion of New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report regarding the need for a court of tax appeals).
B.B.A., University of San Diego, 1981; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1984.
B.A., Long Island University at C.W. Post, 1980; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School,
1984.

